The paper investigates whether and how performance of regional commercial courts has a¤ected external credit of Russian enterprises between 1995 and 2002. The results show that more reliable courts lead to higher bank lending to …rms. This occurs predominantly through expansion of the number of businesses which have access to bank …nancing. There is limited evidence that trade credit also responds to changes in quality of courts. However, credit from suppliers is considerably less sensitive to court performance than bank credit.
Introduction
Bank lending to private …rms in Russia averaged 13% of GDP between 1995 and 2002 . This is in stark contrast to the rest of the industrialized world: among G7 countries this ratio was 86% in the same period. Among Russian medium and large size …rms, less than half hold bank loans. For those who do, these loans amount to 10% of total assets. This is about a third of the proportion reported by …rms in G7 economies 1 . Given the role of …nancial intermediation in promoting investment and economic growth, it is important to explain such di¤erences 2 . This paper studies the role of law enforcement in explaining the pattern of credit received by …rms in Russia. The poor state of Russia's judiciary is often named one of the top reasons for the country's economic problems 3 . According to a World Bank survey, only 18% of Russian respondent …rms believe that commercial court system in Russia is consistent and reliable 4 . This paper links credit received by Russian …rms to quality of commercial courts in regions where these …rms locate. I match data on …rm-level credit received by approximately 20,000 large and medium size enterprises with statistics on performance of 81 regional commercial courts for eight consecutive years, from 1995 to 2002.
Less than half of …rms in the sample receive bank loans, but almost all the …rms have trade credit. During the sample period, which includes the 1998 …nancial crisis, the share of …rms with access to either type of credit declined. At the same time, the amount of credit received by enterprises who continue to have access to it increased. Behind these aggregate trends lie substantial di¤erences in external …nancing of …rms located in di¤erent regions of Russia, which, this study argues, can in part be explained by di¤erent performance of commercial courts in these regions.
I develop an analytical framework to analyze how courts may a¤ect lending decisions. It is based on the premise that, if there is a dispute between a lender and a …rm, litigation is more costly than an out-of-court settlement. The model then shows that lender's costs of contract enforcement increase when lower courts are less reliable predictors of higher courts decisions 5 . I also show that the rate of appeal of lower court decisions rises when the lower court is less reliable. This allows me to use the rate of appeal of lower court decisions as a proxy for court reliability in my empirical estimations.
My empirical results show that when commercial courts are more reliable, banks lend more to …rms located in these courts'jurisdictions. First, I …nd that improvements in reliability of commercial courts increase the number of …rms to which banks are willing to lend. Second, the amount of bank credit received by …rms also rises with court reliability. The results also show that the latter e¤ect is signi…cantly smaller and potentially less robust than the former. Court performance also in ‡uences trade credit, but this e¤ect is notably smaller in magnitude and the inference is less robust. Improvements in court performance are not found to increase credit received by …rms from other enterprises with whom they have ownership links.
This evidence in this study lends new support to the view that legal environment is important for economic and …nancial development. Among the …rst studies to show a positive relationship between rule of law and countries' growth rates were Keefer and Knack (1995) and Mauro (1995) . Yet, causality between quality of law enforcement and development proved notoriously di¢ -cult to establish: a positive relationship may be observed, for instance, because more advanced economies are able to build more reliable court systems. La Porta et al (1997) re…ne this approach by looking separately at various aspects of law on books on the one hand, and quality of law enforcement on the other, and linking them to external …nancing. In their 1998 paper, they show that a relationship exists between legal origin, law on books and concentration of ownership. Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998) also show a positive relationship between the rule of law and the use of external …nancing in di¤erent countries. Pistor et al (2000) focus on external …nance in transition economies. Their results again point at the existence of a strong link between law and …nance: for example, they show that improving legal environment from Russia's level to that of Poland increases market capitalization by 20% and private credit by 25%. They …nd that law enforcement has a larger impact on external …nance than law on the books. Turning to trade credit in transition countries, survey evidence by Johnson et al (1999) shows that …rms who have more con…dence in courts are more willing to extend credit to customers. This e¤ect is weaker for those suppliers that have had a relationship with a customer for some time.
In cross-country studies, identi…cation of the e¤ect of law enforcement is usually hindered by di¢ culty of controlling for country characteristics. Subnational studies help improve identi…cation: Chemin (2004) compares the speed of courts across Indian states and shows that in states with faster courts …rms have more external …nancing and undertake more speci…c investment. Within …ve Eastern European countries, Johnson et al (2002) show that …rms who report that courts perform better are also more likely to invest, although they are no more likely to receive bank …nancing than other …rms.
In this study, both time and cross-regional variation in court quality is utilized. Much of the policy and macroeconomic environment is common across Russia's regions, making it easier to separate the e¤ect of law enforcement from other factors. Credibility of the results is improved by using an objective mea-sure of reliability of courts. The study also establishes a speci…c mechanism through which reliability and predictability of the court system a¤ects the willingness of banks to extend credit.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, I develop an analytical framework to show how reliability and predictability of the court system a¤ects lending decisions. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 develops an empirical model and reports results of the estimations. Section 5 concludes.
Analytical framework
This section develops a simple model to understand how law enforcement by courts may a¤ect lending to …rms. The is based on a premise that, if a dispute arises, litigation is a more costly option than a settlement. I de…ne the reliability of a (lower level) court as the extent to which its decision reduces uncertainty about what is lawful, and in particular, what a higher court would consider lawful in the case at hand. I refer to a court system as more predictable when the reliability of the lower courts is higher. The model shows that the expected contract enforcement costs of lenders fall when courts are more reliable.
First, I show that when lower courts are less reliable, lenders are more likely to litigate rather than settle their disputes with borrowers. This raises the expected costs of contract enforcement for lenders and therefore discourages credit. Lenders who face a higher probability of a default on a loan are more a¤ected by reliability of courts. Second, the model demonstrates that lower court reliability leads to a higher probability that a court's decision is appealed. This allows me to use the rate of appeals as a proxy for otherwise unobserved reliability of the lower court in subsequent empirical estimation.
Finally, the developed framework shows which other factors may impact both the rate of appeal and bank lending, and how. These …ndings help interpret the results in section 4.
Set up
To help follow the model, appendix A lays out its timing.
Consider a bank that decides whether to extend a loan of amount L to a …rm. For simplicity set the bank's costs of loanable funds to zero.
With some probability d the bank expects the …rm to default on the loan. If default occurs, the bank threatens to sue the …rm in the lower court, and then in the court of appeals, if necessary. Suppose that the bank knows with certainty that it will win in the court of appeals.
The …rm faces uncertainty and attaches probability to the bank winning the appeal. Although is not observable to the bank; it is known to be uniformly distributed on a [0; 1] interval 6 . The …rm makes an o¤er of an out-of-court settlement to the bank. Assume a Nash bargaining solution with the bank keeping share of surplus generated by the settlement. Let s denote the total amount that the bank keeps in case of a settlement. Let denote the probability that out-of-court bargaining between the …rm and the bank breaks down, and the case goes to the lower court 7 . Let c be the costs of litigating in lower court, borne by each party:
Assume that the lower court makes a decision in favour of the bank with probability . In other words, captures the frequency with which the lower court correctly anticipates the decision of the court of appeal.
After the lower court decision, the party that lost in the lower court threatens the other with appeal. The …rm updates its expectations and arrives at ; a posterior probability that the bank will win the appeal: The …rm and the bank then bargain over a settlement to avoid appeal. Let S denote the amount received by the bank if they settle. Again I use the Nash bargaining solution here. If bargaining breaks down, the dispute goes to the court of appeals. Let denote the probability that the case goes to appeal given that it has been litigated in the lower court. Let C be the costs of litigating in appellate court for each side:
Analysis
At time t = 0 the bank decides whether to extend a loan. It has the following expected pro…t function
At t = 1, the …rm defaults on the loan with probability d: If default occurs, the bank threatens with litigation. Since litigation is costly, it is e¢ cient to settle out of court. The …rm makes an o¤er of a settlement to the bank. The …rm and the bank will settle as long as the minimum settlement that the bank asks for does not exceed the maximum expected loss from litigation for the …rm
This inequality holds with probability
uncertainty for simplicity. Relaxing this assumption does not a¤ect the results. 7 The idea of out of court bargaining in presence of uncertainty over potential court decision is due to Priest and Klein (1984) . 8 At t = 1, prior to the lower court decision, the …rm expects to go all the way to appeal if litigation occurs. Thus, the maximum amount it is prepared to o¤er to settle at t = 1 is its expected loss from litigating in both courts, i.e. L + c + C:
At t = 1 the bank, knowing the distribution of ; the value of and the fact that he will win at appeal, can calculate the probability of settlement at t = 3: Thus, the bank's minimum accepted settlement at t = 1 is somewhat greater than L c C; but for simplicity I ignore this secondary e¤ect.
If the settlement occurs, the bank receives
where E( j > 1 2(c + C)=L) = 1 (c + C)=L and E(:) is the expectations operator:
If agreement on a settlement is not reached, at t = 2 the bank and the …rm litigate in the lower court. The latter decides in favour of the bank with probability .
At t = 3; the …rm updates its estimated probability of the bank winning the appeal using new information contained in the lower court's decision. Using Bayes'rule, the …rm's posterior estimate of this probability is The …rm updates more, i.e. its posterior is further away from ; when the lower court decision contains more information about what will happen at appeal. More precisely, is further away from when is further away from 1=2.
9 . Thus, the lower court decisions reduce uncertainty more when j 1=2j is higher. To use the de…nition introduced in the beginning of section 2, the lower court is a more reliable predictor of appellate court's judgements when j 1=2j is higher 10 . The …rm and the bank then bargain over a settlement S to be received by the bank if appeal is to be avoided. Settlement occurs as long as
The probability of a settlement given that dispute had been litigated in the lower court is given by
where
Proposition 1
The probability of appeal to a higher court, , falls with reliability of lower court decisions, j 1=2j:
The proof of proposition 1 is in appendix B. The intuition is the following: when the lower court is more reliable, the …rm's estimated probability of the bank winning the appeal increases more (i.e. moves closer to the true value of 1). Consequently, the …rm o¤ers more to the bank to settle the dispute out of court. This reduces the ex ante probability of appeal for any initial value of :
If dispute is settled, the bank receives a settlement
If, on the other hand, the bargaining at t = 3 breaks down, the two parties go on to litigate in the court of appeals, which returns a verdict in favour of the bank. Substituting results in (7) and (8), we can express the bank's pro…t in terms of exogenous variables. This gives rise to the following:
Proposition 2
Lender's expected costs fall with court reliability, j 1=2j:
The proof of Proposition 2 is in appendix C. This proposition contains the basic insight into how reliability of court decisions a¤ects lending. When the lower court is more reliable, the …rm receives more information from its decision about the would-be outcome of the case at appeal. When the …rm better anticipates the decision of the appellate court, it is willing to o¤er more to the bank in a settlement, and the litigation at appeal is less likely. Since litigation is costly, this lowers the expected costs of enforcing the loan contract for the lender, and, therefore, makes the lender more likely to extend the loan.
11 . The impact of court reliability on the bank's costs, and, therefore, lending, is larger when the probability of a default is larger. This implies that lenders that have access to better selection or monitoring technology will be less in ‡uenced by the quality of courts in their lending decisions.
Propositions 1 and 2 provide motivation for the empirical analysis of section 4. In practice j 1=2j is not directly observable. It a¤ects lending by reducing the probability of litigation in the appellate court. Therefore, the impact of court reliability on lending decisions can be empirically identi…ed by estimating the relationship between loans extended and the probability of appeal.
The framework above also identi…es three other factors that a¤ect both the probability of appeal and the lender's expected pro…ts 12 . First, the size of loan L in ‡uences the probability of appeal. The sign of the e¤ect of L on depends on the values of other variables ( , c and C).
Second, both the probability of appeal and expected pro…ts of the lender are a¤ected by how good the …rm is at estimating its chances of winning in court. In the framework above, this corresponds to the range of the …rm's prior around the bank's true chances of winning at appeal. Reducing this range increases both the probability of appeal and expected pro…ts of lenders.
Finally, the probability of appeal and expected pro…ts are both a¤ected by costs of litigation (c and C). The sign of this e¤ect is uncertain, and depends on :
These in ‡uences are further discussed in section 4.3, after empirical results are presented.
3 Background and data
Institutional background
Economic disputes between …rms, individual entrepreneurs and the state fall under the jurisdiction of Russian arbitrazh courts. These are professional courts organized in a three-tier structure: courts of …rst instance (regional courts), appellate courts (okrug courts), and the Supreme Arbitration Court.
Regional courts were created in 1991 in 81 of Russia's 89 administrative regions. They replaced the Soviet system of arbitration tribunals which had dealt with con ‡icts between state-owned enterprises under central planning. Although the old name was kept, the new system was set up quite di¤erently from the Soviet one 13 . The jurisdiction of each regional arbitrazh court coincides with the administrative borders of the region 14 . The plainti¤ is required to …le his suit in the arbitrazh court of the region where the defendant is o¢ cially registered, preventing 'venue shopping'. Therefore, if a …rm defaults on a loan, the lender will be suing it in the commercial court of the region where the …rm is registered. This implies that lending to …rms should be a¤ected by the quality of the court where these …rms are registered, rather than the court in the region where the lender is registered.
Litigants unhappy with a decision of the regional court can appeal it to a corresponding okrug court of appeals, of which there are ten it total 15 ;16 . These courts were established in 1995. The jurisdiction of each appellate court includes from 7 to 11 regional arbitrazh courts 17 . In contrast with regional courts, all cases …led with courts of appeal are tried by at least three judges. There are no restrictions on the types of cases that can be appealed.
Litigants can appeal decisions of okrug courts further to the Supreme Arbitration Court of Russia. Yet, it selects and reviews only a small fraction of suits …led with it.
In an e¤ort to isolate arbitrazh courts from the in ‡uence of regional and local authorities, arbitrazh court system is o¢ cially …nanced solely from the federal 1 3 See, for instance, Hendley (1998). 1 4 The exceptions are eight regions which do not have an 'own'court. 1 5 An 'okrug'is a large geographical division in Russia which includes several regions. 1 6 Before a decision of a regional court comes into force, a litigant who is unsatis…ed with it can also request a re-consideration by a three judge panel of the same regional court. 1 7 The exception is Moscow okrug court which only covers two regional courts.
budget. Once a judge has been appointed to an arbitrazh court, he has tenure until he retires. The salary of a judge cannot be reduced throughout his career. Although initial appointment procedures for arbitrazh judges di¤er across regional courts and between regional and okrug courts, most of the time the …nal selection is done by a federal o¢ ce from a shortlist of candidates compiled by a committee of judges. Deciding which judges get promoted is the prerogative of the presidential o¢ ce, again after a committee of judges had short-listed the candidates. Litigation fees are set by a federal law, the same for all courts of each tier. In Russia, between 1995 and 2001, 63% of all cases resolved by regional commercial courts were disputes between enterprises, including banks. The vast majority of these were breach of contract suits. In the same period, litigants took roughly 5% of all regional court decisions to appellate courts 18 . Table 1 provides the descriptive statistics for the main variables used in this study. The data on annual activity of each regional commercial court is has been obtained from the Supreme Arbitration Court of Russia. The …rm level data on credits and loans received were taken from the Alba/Gnozis collection of accounting reports of medium and large size Russian enterprises 19 . Regional characteristics, used as control variables, were taken from annual publications of Goskomstat (the state statistical committee) and the Ministry of Finance.
Data
External credit is observed for each of approximately 20,000, medium and large size enterprises every year between 1995 and 2002 20 . The sample accounts for approximately 1% all registered …rms in Russia, and about 16% of total employment. Just under half of all …rms are industrial …rms, and about a third are providers of services. Construction …rms make up 11% of the sample, transport …rms -8%, and agricultural …rms -3%. Outlier …rms with credit to assets ratio in the top 1/2% of the distribution in any of the years were removed from the sample.
Trade credit is the single most important source of lending received by Russian …rms: across the eight sampled years, it accounts, on average, for 51% of the stock of debt held by them (or 23% of …rms'total assets). As in other countries, it is also the most common one: 97% of …rms receive at least some trade credit from their suppliers.
In contrast, just 41% of …rms report having bank credit. Among …rms that do receive bank loans, they accounts for 19% of all external debts (or 10% of assets), and represent the second most important source of credit after that from suppliers.
Between 1995 and 1998, the sample average of bank credit to assets fell, hitting the low of 5% in the year of Russia's banking crisis. It then saw a gradual recovery in post-crisis years to 10% in 2002. This pattern is consistent with the aggregate …gures published by the Central Bank of Russia.
This trend masks two opposing e¤ects: continuous expansion of bank credit by …rms that have access to it counteracted by a fall in the number of such …rms. Evolution of the share of …rms with bank credit varies signi…cantly from region to region, and some examples are shown in …gure 4. In some regions, this …rst fell, and then rose again over time. Steady declines were observed, for example, in Chukotsky region and Dagestan.
The court data covers 81 regional arbitrazh courts over the same period of eight years, 1995-2002. The rate of appeals was calculated by dividing the number of regional court decisions appealed by the number of all cases completed in the same court in the same year 21 . As shown in table 1, the mean rate of appeal in the sample is 5% 22 . Average rates for individual courts vary from 3% (Bashkortostan) to 11% (Moscow city) 23 .
Empirical method and results
The econometric analysis is based on a panel data model of the form
where y is the credit of …rm i located in region r at time t; and rt is the rate of appeals in regional commercial court r and time t: Thus, 1 rt captures reliability of the regional court. Other exogenous variables are denoted by x itr . If more reliable courts have a positive e¤ect on lending, should be positive and signi…cant.
Three issues arise when estimating and interpreting the parameters of this model. First, many …rms in the sample have no bank credit. Since bank credit cannot be negative, the appropriate model for describing its behaviour is y irt = max(0; (1 rt ) + x irt + u irt ): Thus, a linear estimation of the relationship between y irt and 1 rt would produce inconsistent coe¢ cients. Therefore, I estimate a non-linear tobit model in subsection 4.1.
The second concern is the nature of unobserved elements (u irt ) in equation (9). When the error term includes …rm or region speci…c characteristics, these are common to several observations, and residuals for these observations will be correlated. This requires standard errors of estimators to be adjusted accordingly.
Third, if we believe these unobserved characteristics (u irt ) to be correlated with the law enforcement variable 1 rt , estimators that ignore this correlation will be inconsistent. Unfortunately, non-linear estimation procedures have 2 1 An alternative de…nition, where the number of cases appealed was divided by all cases completed in the previous year, was also tested: this does not signi…cantly a¤ect the conclusions.
2 2 For comparison, in the US, the rate of appeal of district court decisions was 13.5% in 2000. This includes all civil cases, not only commercial disputes.
2 3 Variation in (perceived) e¤ectiveness of courts is also found by Frye and Zhuravskaya (2000) who survey of small shops in three Russian cities. signi…cant limitations in dealing with such omitted variables. In section 4.2, I argue that my results using tobit model indicate that a discrete choice model may capture well the main e¤ect of law enforcement on credit here. I, therefore, use discrete choice models for robustness checks in section 4.2.
Throughout this empirical section, I try to be explicit about the assumptions I make on u irt . I start with most innocuous ones in subsection 4.1; and then relax them in the robustness discussion in 4.2.
Finally, subsection 4.3 focuses on further interpretation of obtained results. It comes back to the issue that the rate of appeals might proxy for variables other than reliability of courts, raised earlier in the paper. Table 2 summarizes the results of estimating the e¤ect of reliability of courts on credit received by …rms using (9).
Basic results
Column 1 looks at bank credit, measured as a fraction of the …rm's total assets. I …nd a highly signi…cant and positive e¤ect of court reliability on bank credit. The model is estimated using tobit, with the marginal e¤ects given in columns 1a and 1b. The e¤ect of court reliability on the size of loans to …rms that are receiving them is positive and signi…cant (column 1a). So is the e¤ect of court reliability on the probability that a …rms receives a loan (column 1b). The latter is signi…cantly greater than the former. This suggests that improvements in law enforcement mostly work through broadening access to credit for …rms who have not been borrowing before, rather than increasing the size of loans to …rms that are already borrowing.
In terms of magnitude, a one percentage point reduction in the rate of appeals increases the probability that a …rm receives bank credit by 1.2%. This suggests, for example, that replacing Chukotsky commercial court (one of the courts with the highest appeal rates), with that from Vladimirskaya oblast, should increase the number of …rms who receive bank credit by about 8% 24 . Turning to trade credit, column 2 shows that the coe¢ cient on reliability of law enforcement is also positive and signi…cant. However, it is notably smaller than the coe¢ cient on bank credit. Since only 4% of observations in the sample report zero trade credit, the non-linear e¤ects are likely to be small. Accordingly, a linear model is estimated in column 3. Its results are consistent with the tobit model.
Column 4 looks at credit received by enterprises from dependent …rms. It is not a¤ected by law enforcement. In columns 5 and 6, I test for impact of court reliability on trade credit extended by the sampled …rms to their customers, and …nd no e¤ect. Since the lender must sue the borrower in the borrower's region, this is consistent with …rms extending credit to customers located in other regions.
Altogether, these results make sense: The number of …rms receiving bank credit increases when regional courts are more reliable. The loan amounts also rise but the e¤ect is smaller. This is consistent with contract enforcement costs being largely …xed. Credit from suppliers is notably less sensitive to court performance. This is consistent with major theories of trade credit, that suggest that suppliers have better access to information and monitoring of their clients than banks 25 . This result also agrees with Johnson et al (1999) who show that Eastern European suppliers respond more to perceived court quality when the customer is new. Finally, lending from …rms who are connected to the borrower through ownership links, and, therefore, largely protected from the borrower's default, is not a¤ected by court performance.
Robustness
The next task is to assess the robustness of these …ndings. The tobit model assumes that the error terms, u irt are independently normally distributed, and uncorrelated with the law enforcement variable. However, because the empirical model does not account for all …rm and regional factors a¤ecting credit, a more realistic form of the error term allows for interdependence across observations i.e.
Here r captures a region speci…c e¤ect common to all …rms located in one region (for example, physical infrastructure), and i captures a …rm e¤ect (for instance, managerial ability), under the assumption that both of these stay the same for the sample period. This has two implications. First of all, the true variance-covariance matrix of u irt will now have non-zero o¤-diagonal elements for observations from the same region and for the same …rm. Ignoring these will underestimate the standard errors of regression coe¢ cients. In my data, this e¤ect is aggravated because the law enforcement variable is measured at the level of region, and does not vary across observations for …rms located in the same region for any given year (see Moulton (1990) ).
Secondly, if either r or i are correlated with law enforcement, a model that does not account for this will produce inconsistent estimates. As discussed in more detail below, some of regional factors may be correlated with reliability of court decisions. It is less likely that individual …rm characteristics have an impact on regional rate of appeals at courts. Still, this cannot be ruled out since the sample includes large …rms.
If data generating process were linear, the issue of correlation between r ;
i and explanatory variables could have been addressed by taking advantage of panel structure of the data and estimating a '…xed e¤ects'regression. In a non-linear framework, introducing regional or …rm dummies does not solve the problem. In tobit type models, this problem is especially di¢ cult to deal with when the common factors are unobservable 26 . My …ndings so far suggest that the dominant e¤ect of better court performance is on the probability of a …rm receiving a loan. Focusing on this, I rede…ne the dependent variable as a binary (discrete choice) indicator which equals to 1 if the …rm has a loan, and 0 otherwise. Table 3 estimates a logit (column 1) and a linear probability (column 2) models using this binary outcome. The results con…rm the highly signi…cant positive e¤ect of court reliability on bank lending found in the tobit model. The marginal e¤ect of reducing the rate of appeal on the probability of receiving a bank loan is 1.1%, which is almost the same as that obtained from the tobit model.
Shifting the focus to the probability of getting a loan allows me to tackle the problem of …xed unobserved e¤ects. Column 2 demonstrates that the estimates remain robust when all …xed regional level e¤ects are controlled for by dummies in a linear model. To address a further issue of unobserved …rm level e¤ects, a …rm …xed e¤ects model is estimated using conditional logit (column 3) and linear probability (column 4). The coe¢ cient on court reliability remains positive and signi…cant at 1% level. However, the magnitude of the marginal e¤ect reported in the linear regression is now 0.4%, signi…cantly below the 1.1% obtained earlier.
It so happens that no …rms in the sample moved from one region to another: this implies that allowing for …rm …xed e¤ects also controls for regional level e¤ects. When unobserved e¤ects are given by (10), the error term reduces to " itr after inclusion of …rm level dummies: This means that the …rm …xed e¤ects model in column 4 provides correct estimates of standard errors. This is no longer the case if instead we posit that unobserved regional factors vary over time. Then the error term becomes
Now, even when …rm …xed e¤ects are controlled for, the residuals of observations for …rms located in the same region in the same year are correlated. The standard errors of …xed e¤ects coe¢ cients will be understated, aggravated since law enforcement does not vary across …rms. Furthermore, if elements of rt are correlated with the law enforcement variable, …xed e¤ects estimates may be inconsistent 27 . Estimations reported in table 4 address these issues. I control for some omitted factors whose over time changes may be a¤ecting both court reliability and bank credit.
So far, dynamic regional factors, such as the level of regional development and regional government policies, have not been included. Yet, there are no obvious channels through which such factors could in ‡uence court reliability: re-gional commercial courts are …nanced and organized by the federal government, who appoints judges taken from the national pool of candidates.
Using the same logic, court quality is likely to be correlated with assistance from the federal centre to a particular region. Such assistance may also a¤ect lending to …rms in its own right. I control for federal support using three measures of government subsidies: …rst, direct subsidies from the federal government to the regional government; second, subsidies to individual …rms, and third, the amount individual …rms owe in tax arrears 28 . In addition, I control for changes in regional infrastructure over time by including the fraction of the population with access to telephones. Finally, I include court case load per judge to control for the possibility that increases in regional economic activity raise both bank credit and the number of law suits, a¤ecting court performance. Results in column 1 show that inclusion of these controls does not a¤ect the estimated impact of court reliability on access to credit.
I now introduce controls for changes in …rm level factors. Current assets proxy for the …rm's demand for short term …nancing. The fraction of …nished goods in inventory measures the ease with which creditors can liquidate short term assets in case of a default. Column 2 shows that the coe¢ cient on court reliability remains positive and signi…cant when these controls are included. Both controls are signi…cant and have expected positive signs.
The regression shown in column 3 addresses contemporaneous correlation of residuals potentially caused by omitting time varying regional factors. Standard errors of coe¢ cients in column 3 are adjusted for this using a procedure outlined in Rogers (1993) , and usually referred to as 'clustering.' Although the standard error of the estimated impact of court reliability has now risen, the e¤ect is still positive and signi…cant at the 5% level.
I now perform the most stringent robustness test by adding region speci…c time trends to control for changes in omitted variables over time. The e¤ect of court reliability can no longer be identi…ed. This is not entirely surprising: inclusion of regional time trends reduces the variation from which the e¤ect of law enforcement is identi…ed to deviations from the regional trend.
Coming back to the size of bank loans that …rms receive, the e¤ect of courts on it does not seem to disappear when region speci…c trends are used. The estimation in column 5 uses bank credit to assets ratio as a dependent variable in a linear model. In column 6, the same equation is estimated only for observations where bank credit is positive. Despite inclusion of region speci…c trends, the e¤ect of court reliability is positive and signi…cant. However, these estimation must be viewed with caution, since bank credit data is, by nature, non-linear.
Finally, table 5 revisits the relationship between predictability of the court system and credit from sources other than banks, now using a …rm …xed effects speci…cation. The e¤ect of courts on trade credit received can no longer be identi…ed. The impact of court reliability on credit from …rms connected through ownership has a negative sign. This suggests that as courts' perfor-mance improves, …rms switch from internal to external sources of funding.
To summarize, the positive e¤ect of court reliability on the proportion of …rms receiving bank credit is robust to controlling for regional and …rm …xed e¤ects. This e¤ect remains highly signi…cant also when a number of important regional level and …rm level controls are included. It is robust to adjustment of the standard errors for intra-…rm and contemporaneous intra-regional correlation. However, the e¤ect of law enforcement on access to bank credit can no longer be identi…ed when region speci…c time trends are included.
The rate of appeals as a proxy for other things
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A remaining concern is that one minus the rate of appeals might proxy for something other than reliability of the lower court's decisions. Section 2 showed that court reliability j 1=2j directly a¤ects the rate of appeals and through it, bank's pro…ts 30 . However, it is also in ‡uenced by three other factors: …rst, average amount at stake; second, the parties'ability to assess legality of their claim; and third, costs of litigation. Since my regressions do not control for these explicitly, I shall now consider how the interpretation of my results may be a¤ected by omission of these three variables.
First, the average amount at stake is likely to be positively correlated with the size of credit received by …rms. This may a¤ect interpretation of estimations with size of loan as a dependent variable. From the model in section 2, the stake's impact on the rate of appeals is ambiguous. If it is negative, omission of the average amount at stake will underestimate the e¤ect of court reliability on size of bank loans, and vice versa. Yet, omission of the stake variable should not in ‡uence estimations where the probability of getting a loan is used as a dependent variable, since there is no obvious correlation between such probability and dispute stake. Thus, the interpretation of my …nding that higher court reliability increases the number of …rms that get bank credit should not be a¤ected.
Second, when the …rm's ability to anticipate the decisions of appellate court improves (range of shrinks), this reduces the expected bank's costs of enforcing loan contracts: At the same time, it also increases the rate of appeals 31 . Therefore, omitting the degree of sophistication of litigating parties from regressions biases the coe¢ cient on court performance downwards. This implies that my results underestimate the true e¤ect of court performance on external …nance.
Third, the costs of litigation can be broken down into court fees, and other …rm speci…c costs (such as lawyer fees, reputation e¤ects etc.). The former do not vary across Russian courts, and their e¤ects are controlled for by year dummies. All …xed components of …rm speci…c costs and reputation e¤ects are controlled for by …rm dummies. Yet, if such costs have a dynamic …rm speci…c component, it is possible that the coe¢ cient on 1 picks up some of their e¤ect. From section 2, costs of litigation have an ambiguous e¤ect on the rate of appeals and the expected total costs of enforcing repayment by lenders (it depends on ). When the costs move these two variables in opposite directions, my empirical …ndings may understate the impact of court consistency on lending. When these two variables change in the same direction in response to changes in litigation costs, my results may indeed overstate the e¤ect of court performance on external …nancing.
Concluding remarks
This paper examines the link between law enforcement and credit extended to …rms. Empirical evidence indicates that reliability of commercial court decisions is an important determinant of lending to …rms. I have shown that improvements in court performance lead to a rise in the number of …rms to which banks issue credit. They also tend to increase the size of loans that banks extend. In contrast, the impact of court performance on trade credit is much weaker and less robust.
The study focuses on a particular aspect of court performance: the reliability of the judicial decisions as predictors of what is lawful. It also identi…es a channel through which law enforcement e¤ect operates: when law enforcement is more predictable, this encourages early settlement between disputing parties, helps avoid costly litigation and therefore reduces expected costs of contract enforcement for banks and other lenders 32 . The analysis provides new evidence that the legal environment is important for …nancial and economic development. Furthermore, it shows that the speci…c ways in which courts enforce laws have a substantial impact, even when law on the books remains the same. This suggests, that looking at di¤erences in the process of law enforcement and not just laws themselves is important for understanding why di¤erent legal systems are associated with di¤erent patterns of economic development. Litigation in lower court Following decision, firm updates probability of bank winning appeal.
Party that lost at t=2 threatens with appeal.
Firm and bank bargain over settlement. Here I show that the probability that the lower court decision is appealed, , falls in court reliability, j 1=2j: Recall that is the probability that the …rm's estimate of the bank's chances to win the appeal is above ; given that it is below 1 2(c+C)=L (the condition for litigation in the lower court). Thus, = min [ =(1 2(C + c)=L); 1] + (1 ): Let us …rst consider the case when > 1=2: For to fall in j 1=2j in this case; it must fall in : Di¤erentiating with respect to gives
Thus, 
where = E( j < < 1 2(C + c)=L): To sign (14), note that d > 0; > 0; and L C > 0: In appendix B, I have shown that @ =@ > 0: Since [( 1)L + 2C] is the surplus from settlement, it is positive. Finally, the …rm's posterior estimate of the bank's chances to win the appeal, given that the settlement is achieved also increases with reliability of the lower court: (1)
(2a) Owed to government by firm -0.000** 0.000** 0.000** (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Dependent variable
Credit from dependent firms
Method
OLS
Dependent variable Method
Logit
Regional telephone coverage -0.000 -0.000 0.000 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) Judicial caseload -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) Linear probability model (1) (2) 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 8 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 2 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 6 1 99 8 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 2 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 8 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 2 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 8 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 2 A stra hanskaya o blast 
